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Abstract
Over the last two decades, private renting has undergone a major revival in the UK, more
than doubling its share within the housing system. Young adults increasingly remain in the
sector into their 30s, giving rise to the term ‘Generation Rent’. Using data from the UK’s
Family Resources Survey, this article shows how reliance on the sector varies by poverty
status, particularly for young adults and children. In 2017/18, 42 per cent of adults under 40
in low-income poverty lived in private renting, compared with just 26 per cent of non-poor.
This is almost double the proportion of 20 years earlier. Private renting is now home to more
poor adults under 40 than owner occupation and social renting combined. In addition, one in
three children in poverty (36 per cent) now lives in private renting, three times the level of
20 years ago. For both adults and children, rates are even higher in London and the South.
Although rates of increase have slowed in recent years, this dramatic shift in the housing
circumstances of those in poverty has a number of implications for housing and social policy
which have not yet been sufficiently recognised.
Introduction
The re-growth of the private rented sector (PRS) over the last two decades marks a fundamen-
tal change in the UK’s housing system. It is a trend which is apparent in a number of advanced
industrialised countries, especially as access to homeownership has become more difficult [1]
[2] [3], but it is particularly pronounced here, with the sector rising from 9 per cent of dwell-
ings in 1991 to 19 per cent in 2017 (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-
tables-on-dwelling-stock-including-vacants). This re-growth has been at the expense of both
owner occupation and social renting, and it has been very heavily focussed on younger adults.
With increasing barriers to mortgage finance, stagnating earnings and a dwindling social
housing supply, they can now expect to spend many more years in this sector than their
parents, giving rise to the term ‘Generation Rent’ [4] [5].
In drawing attention to the divide between generations, however, this term serves to obsc-
ure important divisions within the current generation of young people and hence to mask the
implications for social and housing policy. A number of studies have begun to reveal some of
these divisions. Studies have shown that it is those young people who cannot draw on parental
resources to help buy who will spend longer in private renting [6]. Kemp [7] shows that, even
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in 2007, the sector in England was playing a disproportionate role in housing those in low-
income poverty and that this produced poorer outcomes for them in terms of housing stan-
dards and affordability. Coulter [8] shows how it is more disadvantaged groups in particular
which saw rates of private renting rising between 2001 and 2011. In Northern Ireland, low-
income households were making up an increasing share of the PRS [9].
To date, however, there has not been a systematic analysis of the changing role of the sector
in relation to poverty. One possible reason for this omission is that such a change was never
envisaged in UK policy efforts to revitalise the PRS. The overwhelming focus there has been
on stemming the long-term decline of the sector in order to maintain flexibility in the housing
system. The PRS is the sector best placed to provide rapid access to meet short-term housing
needs. As such it provides housing for young, mobile workers in particular, aiding the func-
tioning of local economies. It was never promoted as a medium- to long-term housing solution
for low income households because of its obvious shortcomings in this regard. Compared with
the main alternative of social renting, it is characterised by much greater problems of afford-
ability, lower property and management standards, and greater insecurity [7] [8] [10]. The
sector seems particularly ill-suited to meet the needs of low-income families where frequent
movement might be expected to be harmful to children’s social and educational development.
The aim of this article is to examine the changing role of the PRS in housing young adults
and children living in poverty. The article uses data from a UK household survey designed to
provide rich detail on household financial circumstances, the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
This is a continuous cross-sectional household survey, covering a sample of 1.3 million indi-
viduals over the years 1994/95-2017/18. It is this data which the UK Government uses for its
annual Households Below Average Income (HBAI) analysis [11]–effectively the official report
on poverty in the UK. A particular novelty of the analysis is the use of Lexis surface visualisa-
tions [12] to capture trends over time and by age in great detail. These enrich our understand-
ing of the changes in a way which is immediately accessible, providing a clearer understanding
of how tenure change is occurring and who is affected.
In the remainder of this introduction, the background to the re-growth of the PRS is exam-
ined in more detail. The article then discusses the data and analytical approach. Findings
cover the shifts in housing tenure first, before looking at the situations of adults and children
separately, broken down by poverty status. The article also examines regional variations and
whether the experience of insecurity within the PRS varies with poverty status. It concludes
with a discussion of the issues raised for social and housing policy.
Poverty and the PRS
For most of the last century, private renting in the UK was in decline. Its role in housing those
in poverty became very marginal as the UK developed a substantial social rented sector with a
strong welfare focus [13] [14] [15] [16]. The term ‘social rented sector’ covers a range of orga-
nisations providing rental housing at below-market rents, usually relying in part on provider
subsidies from national government which also regulate their activities to a high degree. Social
landlords include public bodies, notably local authorities, as well as those in the voluntary or
third sector, mostly termed housing associations. Social tenants usually have security of tenure
i.e. the right to remain in the dwelling as long as they want provided they meet the terms of the
lease. Dwellings are allocated on the basis of social and housing need, and tenancies cannot
usually be passed on or inherited.
Compared with other countries with liberal welfare regimes, the UK was unique in having
such a substantial social rented sector. In the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, social
renting accounts for around 5 per cent of the housing stock [17]. In the UK, social renting
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peaked at 33 per cent in 1981 and, even after nearly four decades of decline, it remains at 18
per cent in 2017 (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-
dwelling-stock-including-vacants). As social landlords focussed on meeting housing needs
and these needs are strongly related to poverty [18], the social rented sector housed a substan-
tial proportion of low-income households. It ensured they were able to achieve decent, secure
housing despite the relatively low levels of means-tested welfare benefits in the UK [19]. The
sector declined in size after 1981, driven by a shift in policy from social provision to commodi-
fied market provision, common across many countries [1, 5, 14]. As a result, it became even
more closely associated with social need, in part through the selective loss of better-off house-
holds through the Right-to-Buy and in part through the increasing focus on meeting housing
need under homeless persons’ legislation [20].
Home ownership, by contrast, has long been seen as the aspirational tenure and promoted
as such by successive UK Governments [21], but it too has come to play an expanding role in
housing those in poverty. From the 1980s, its growth was fuelled by increasing numbers of
lower income households, encouraged by government policy which helped ‘normalise’ owner-
ship [5, 21]. Some entered through the heavily-discounted sales of council housing to sitting
tenants under the Right-to-Buy while others on low and uncertain incomes found they could
access mortgage finance as the deregulation of the mortgage market fuelled intense competi-
tion between lenders. Burrows [22] showed that, with a broad poverty measure, half the poor
were homeowners in 1999 although with narrower measures, the proportion was rather lower.
Similarly, Wallace [23] showed that half of all people in low-income poverty on the ‘before
housing cost’ measure were owners in 2013/14, although this share fell to less than one third
on the ‘after housing cost’ measure. Nevertheless, the broad message that a substantial propor-
tion of the poor are home owners became widely recognised. Similar shifts occurred in many
countries with the consequences all too apparent in the wave of repossessions following the
housing market crash of 2007/8 [1].
From the 1980s, a political consensus emerged in the UK on the need to halt the decline
of private renting [24]. In public discourse at least, this was driven almost entirely by concern
over its role in providing short-term, flexible housing for young, mobile workers and hence
aiding local economic functioning although this approach fits also with the longer-term shift
towards commodification in housing noted above. It was recognised that the sector might
continue to play a minor role for low-income households, notably those regarded as a low pri-
ority for social housing [25] but this was seen very much as a ‘residual’ role for the PRS because
of the assumed preference of these households for social renting. More generally, the sector
was seen as a transitional or ‘waiting room’ tenure [25] accommodating people for a relatively
short period before they moved on to one of the two dominant tenures.
The role of the PRS in relation to poverty was also seen as residual in a second sense: as
Kemp [7] argues, the PRS is “a demonstrably inferior tenure for low-income households”
(p1020). The high costs of private rents can act as a barrier to employment or push working
households into poverty [10]. Poor PRS tenants are almost twice as likely to find it difficult to
pay their rent as poor social tenants [7]. In addition, the PRS has long been noted for its poor
property standards and poor quality of management. As it has expanded recently, this has
raised the average quality of properties but those in the PRS remain more likely to have substan-
dard housing [7]. Poor PRS tenants are as likely to struggle to keep their home warm in winter
as poor social tenants, and both are worse off than poor owners and non-poor renters [7].
Most importantly, perhaps, private renting in the UK, as in many other liberal welfare regi-
mes, is distinguished by high levels of insecurity, particularly in comparison with social renting
[26]. This insecurity was the direct goal of deregulation policies in the late 1980s as these were
seen as a necessary pre-condition for attracting re-investment [27] [28]. It is potentially a more
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significant problem for lower income households for two reasons. First, frequent moves may
disrupt social connections to family and friends which low-income households are particularly
reliant on as a source of practical and emotional support [29]. These connections are especially
important for those with children, and lone parents most of all [30]. For children, there is the
additional concern that frequent moves may disrupt not only their social networks but also
their schooling, with longer term impacts on educational attainment. Second, the subjective
experience of insecurity [31] may be more problematic for those in poverty. As their housing
options are much more limited, the threat of loss of accommodation is likely to be a particular
cause of stress.
While some aspects of housing policy in the UK are devolved to regional governments,
devolution has very limited relevance here [13] [14] [15]. In terms of policy, one key differe-
nce noted already is that Scottish local authorities pursued development of social housing
in the postwar period to a much greater extent than those in the rest of the UK. In other
devolved policy areas, there has very largely been parallel development. For example, Right-
to-Buy policies were very closely aligned for most of the last 35 years although there has been
some divergence very recently and, with security of tenure for the PRS, near-identical legal
reforms were enacted in 1988. Scotland may very recently have moved to end ‘no-fault’ evic-
tions but that happened too late to have any bearing on the picture here and may in any case
prove more symbolic than substantive. Beyond explicit housing policy, the factors which
have driven changes in the housing system are UK-wide. The UK government sets tax poli-
cies impacting on incentives to own or the returns from private renting. Pensions policy
reforms which provided further incentives for investment in private renting were also UK-
wide as were the impacts of the GFC on mortgage lending criteria. Variations in housing
affordability appear to be important but these operate across the UK, not just of devolved
regions, and are discussed on that basis.
Welfare reform and the PRS
In the UK, the ability of low-income households to access private renting and the quality of
the accommodation they can afford depends very largely on the means-tested Local Housing
Allowance (LHA)–as noted above, a part of the Housing Benefit system which also covers
households in social renting but with slightly differing entitlements [32]. Around one-in-four
PRS households claims LHA. From April 2011, the Government sought to limit expenditure
on LHA by: reducing the maximum amount of rent for which LHA could be claimed from
the median rent for properties in the local area to the 30th centile; placing an absolute maxi-
mum cap on LHA by size of property regardless of location; and restricting claims from under
35s to the rent for a single room (previously a restriction only applied to under 25s). From
2013/14, the Government limited increases in these allowances to the Consumer Prices Index,
cutting this again to a maximum of 1 per cent from 2014/15 [33]
These changes were achieving annual savings of £1.7 billion by March 2016, impacting on
1.4 million households [34]. Surveys of private landlords in 2015/16 and 2017 suggest that
large proportions are becoming less willing to let to people on LHA (or its successor, Universal
Credit) because of these changes and that many are demanding additional safeguards (rent
guarantors and/or higher deposits) or raising rents in response [35] [36]. Results of the broader
evaluation on the impacts of LHA reforms on tenants and landlords are available from the
Department for Work and Pensions website (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
local-housing-allowance-monitoring-the-impact-of-changes [Accessed 1 December 2019]).
These changes can be seen as part of a wider process of restructuring welfare in the UK,
which has been underway for some time but given additional impetus by the Global Financial
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Crisis (GFC) [1] [4] [21]. In the UK, one specific aspect of this restructuring has been the shift
in welfare support away from working age groups towards the elderly. Pensioners saw poverty
rates halve in the 2000s [11], thanks to additional financial support from the New Labour gov-
ernment. The value of these benefits has been protected from ‘austerity’ so that the burden of
that policy has fallen substantially on the working age population. As a result, poverty has shifted
to working age adults and children: from 80 per cent of the poor in 1996/97, they make up 87
per cent in 2017/18 [11]. Young adults have faced a particularly harsh time, as the example of
LHA reductions makes clear, becoming more dependent for their welfare on their family [37].
Regional variations
The re-growth of the PRS has occurred across the UK but its role in relation to poverty is likely
to vary between regions, reflecting the relative accessibility of other tenures in any given area.
The affordability of owner occupation varies widely, with London and the South facing far
higher costs relative to local wages compared with the Midlands and the North [38]. The sup-
ply of social housing also varies. Scotland has had historically high levels although the gap
with the rest of the UK is narrowing, while London also has a relatively large sector. Bramley
[18] shows how these variations impact on a range of housing outcomes, with higher levels
of unmet need in London and the South, compared with the Midlands and the North. It is
the same areas which face the greatest impacts from the restrictions on LHA: one third of the
affected households are in London, and a further third in the rest of the South [34].
Concealed households and other sharing arrangements
Analyses of changes in tenure are often presented on the basis of households but this masks
the position of people living as a member of someone else’s household [18]. This category
covers many young adults who may not wish to leave home but it also includes others (and
their dependents) who are unable to achieve independence. There tends to be a divide here by
social status [39]; young adults with lower educational attainment tend to leave education
earlier, entering the labour market and forming independent households at a younger age. In
many EU countries, delaying the move to independence has been a more common response to
problems in accessing home ownership than a move to private renting, but the UK has also
seen rising proportions of young adults remaining at home [2].
Summary
The aim of the paper is to assess how the role of the PRS in relation to people in poverty has
changed over the last two decades. It looks at the whole of the UK over a period of 24 years
and seeks to identify how these changes vary by age, for both adults and children. There is a
particular focus on the most recent years when access to LHA has become more restricted. It
also explores variations across regions in relation to housing affordability. Lastly, given the
importance of insecurity of tenure in discussions about private renting, the paper also exam-
ines relative levels of instability in the PRS, and how these vary by poverty status.
Data and methods
Data
Data are taken from the continuous cross-sectional household survey, the Family Resources Sur-
vey (FRS), for the years 1994/95-2017/18 [40], merged with the associated Households Below
Average Income (HBAI) data for the same period [41]. The FRS is an annual UK government sur-
vey which captures detailed measures of household resources. It provides data on the household
Poverty and the re-growth of private renting in the UK
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273 February 5, 2020 5 / 20
including household composition, housing tenure and total income, as well as data on each adult
and child within the household including age, householder status and, if not the householder,
relationship to the householder(s). Children are defined as all those below 16, or 16–18 (occasion-
ally 19) and still in full-time education. The HBAI provides additional derived household-level
variables, including the official measures of low-income poverty, child material deprivation and
severe child poverty (see below and [41] for the technical details). There is a unique key which
enables records to be matched exactly between the two datasets. The HBAI data also include a set
of grossing weights to ensure the data match known age/sex distributions at regional level, and
these are used throughout the analyses here. Across the 24 years covered, the unweighted data
provide information on 1.34 million people–1,010,000 adults and 325,000 children.
Analysis
As noted above, we are interested in tenure for individuals. The FRS identifies the three main
tenure groups: owner occupiers, social renters and private renters. The last includes those who
occupy their accommodation by virtue of their employment (tied accommodation). In addition,
we identify adults within the household who are neither the householder (tenant/owner) nor the
partner of the householder. We classify all of these as living ‘care of’ their household as they do
not have householder status. On average, 12 per cent of adults are in this situation, a figure which
has remained quite static over the last 24 years. The majority are the daughter/son of the house-
holder or of their partner. In addition, a small number of people identify themselves as living
‘rent free’ (around 1 per cent) as they occupy a dwelling typically owned by a family member or
friends without paying rent. They are included in this group on the basis that they have not
shown the ability to become householders in one of the conventional tenures. We therefore allo-
cate adults to one of four tenures: owner occupation (including shared ownership); social renting;
private renting (including tied accommodation); and ‘care of/rent free’. Children are allocated
the tenure of their household so cannot be regarded as ‘care of’; there are around 1 per cent of
children where their parent is not the householder, i.e. they are part of a concealed household.
The main poverty measure used in the paper is the relative low-income poverty measure,
widely used in poverty analysis including by UK Government. It identifies households with an
equivalised income below 60 per cent of the contemporary median; full details are provided in
[11] and [40]. Like Kemp [7], we favour the ‘after housing costs’ (AHC) measure since the
high costs of private renting are a central part of the problem faced by lower income house-
holds in the sector. Results using the BHC measure show similar trends and are made available
through the on-line visualiser (details below).
Since 2004, the Government has used the FRS to measure material deprivation for children
as part of the UK’s official measure of child poverty [42]. Information is collected on a set of 21
items which are regarded as ‘necessities’ by a majority of the UK population, i.e. things which
everyone should be able to afford to have or do, and no one should have to go without. Items
cover both household and child consumption. For the household, they include things such as
the ability to keep the home warm in winter or to pay for home insurance. For children, they
cover things such as a warm coat for winter or money to take part in school trips or activities.
Households with dependent children are asked whether they or their children lack each of
these items and, if so, whether that is due to being unable to afford them (rather than not want-
ing them). The Government uses a system of prevalence weighting to create a combined score
for the 21 items which ranges from 0 to 100, with 25 or more used to identify ‘material depriva-
tion’. The set of items was updated by the Government in 2011 [42] creating some minor dis-
continuity in the measure. For additional background on the development of these measures
and the current methodology see Bailey and Bramley [43].
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Two further poverty measures are available for households with children, identifying tho-
se with both low income and material deprivation on the basis of two different low-income
thresholds. For contrast, this paper uses the more extreme version, where households have an
income below 50 per cent of the contemporary median after housing costs as well as material
deprivation–a situation termed by the Government ‘severe poverty’. In 2017/18, 29 per cent of
children were in low-income poverty, but only 18 per cent were materially deprived and just
5 per cent were in severe poverty.
To examine regional variations, we group the UK’s standard regions on the basis of a mea-
sure of housing affordability produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) [38]: the
ratio of median house prices to median gross annual earnings. London stands out for its poor
affordability ratio (12.9 in 2016), followed by the three Southern regions (8.3 to 9.5), the Mid-
lands (6.2 to 6.4) and the North (5.1 to 5.7). Wales (5.7) is included with the North. Scotland
(not covered by the ONS publication) is treated separately as is Northern Ireland which is only
included in the FRS from 2002/3 onwards.
For people in the PRS, there are no measures of the household’s legal tenure security on the
FRS, i.e. the precise legal arrangement under which they hold their tenancy. We cannot distin-
guish those with some measure of security from those on short-term, insecure tenancies which
are the norm. Instead, to get some measure of security in practice, we look at patterns of recent
mobility: the proportion of households resident in their dwelling for less than one year. The
FRS asks the householder how long they have lived in the property and this is used to provide
a single measure for all household members. The way in which the question is asked changed
slightly from 2012 onwards, and this creates a modest discontinuity in the data.
Methodologically, the paper makes use of Lexis surfaces. These visualisations developed
within demography as a means of portraying the complex interactions of age-period-cohort
effects on mortality or morbidity [12]. Here they are used to show how people are distributed
across tenures, at different ages and time points, and for different sub-groups such as the poor.
A modest amount of smoothing is applied to reduce noise and preserve anonymity: the value
for each cell is averaged with those for the adjacent four cells horizontally and vertically. A red-
green-blue colour scheme is used to represent percentages. As this may not be accessible to
some people with colour-vision impairment, an on-line visualisation tool has been set up
(https://ubdc-apps.shinyapps.io/data_explorer_adult/) to allow users to experiment with a
wide range of colour schemes. Users can also explore how the choice of poverty measure
(before or after housing costs) influences results and examine variations between regions in
much more detail.
Data access and reproducibility
Individual-level survey data were obtained from the UK Data Service (UKDS), and are up-to-
date as at July 2019. The UKDS provides technical reports on the FRS and HBAI datasets. The
SPSS code used to produce this analysis has been made available through Github (https://
github.com/nick-bailey/Poverty-and-private-renting) so others who register for these data can
reproduce the analyses presented here. The aggregated data used to create the Lexis surface
visualisations and the line charts can be downloaded from the same place.
Results
Tenure change
Fig 1 shows tenure change in the UK over the last 24 years for adults (A) and children (B). For
adults, home ownership peaks around 2000, since when it has declined at a steady rate while
social renting declines through most of this period, due largely to the Right-to-Buy. Only
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private renting shows growth, up from 8 per cent in 1994/95 to 17 per cent in 2017/18, albeit
with a noticeable slowing in the last few years. The proportion of adults who are not house-
holders has remained quite steady at around 12 or 13 per cent for the whole period. We do not
see strong evidence of young adults remaining longer in the family home in these data, at least
when considering adults as a whole.
For children, the changes in tenure are even more dramatic. The proportion in owner occu-
pied households has fallen much more sharply since the GFC as families have found it particu-
larly difficult to access mortgage finance although as previously, this decline appears to have
halted in the last couple of years. There are now as many children in private rented househ-
olds as in social rented ones which represents a fundamental shift in the UK housing system.
Private renting is up from one-in-twenty children in 1994/95 to more than one-in-five in
2017/18 (6 to 22 per cent) although, again, the rate of growth appears to have slowed in the last
few years. The proportion of children in social renting has declined over the period as a whole
although it has shown modest recovery in the last five years. As the overall size of social renting
has not risen, the sector is gradually reorienting to play a greater role in meeting the needs of
low-income families.
Lexis surfaces reveal much greater detail for these changes by age, for adults (Fig 2) and
children (Fig 3). In effect, each line in Fig 1 shows the average proportion across all age groups
in a given tenure at each point in time. With the Lexis surface, each line is expanded into a
pane which shows the proportion in that tenure separately for every single year of age (vertical
axis) and how that has changed over time (horizontal axis). Each cell shows the proportion in
a given tenure for people of a particular age in a particular year. Blue represents lower propor-
tions in a given tenure, moving through green to orange and red for the highest proportions.
As people age one year with each year of time that passes, each cohort tracks diagonally up to
the right over time (though note that, as these are not longitudinal data, it is not the same indi-
viduals being tracked but measurement through repeated cross-sections).
The value of Lexis surfaces is that they reveal in much greater detail how a given social
process impacts differentially across the life-course and they provide strong indications of the
kinds of factor at work. Where there is a change which impacts all age groups at a particular
point in time, the surfaces show a strong vertical feature–a period effect, in the language of
Fig 1. Tenure for adults and children, 1994/5-2017/8. (A) Adults. (B) Children. FRS/HBAI data. Years are financial
years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/18).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g001
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demography [12]. There are no such effects evident here which is not surprising given how
durable housing tenure is as a social status. Where there is a change which affects people of the
same age consistently over time, we see strong horizontal features or age effects. For adults, we
see an example in the fourth pane of Fig 2 which shows how all young adults going through
the same process of leaving the family home through late teens and early twenties and, to a
lesser extent in the third pane, entering private renting. Lastly, where there is a change which
affects a specific cohort of people, we see strong diagonal features. These are effects which start
to affect some age groups at a point in time but which then persist for those age groups so that,
in each subsequent year, their situation is different to that for the equivalent age group in pre-
vious years. There are several strong diagonal features in these charts, notably in relation to
private renting for adults and children.
Fig 3. Tenure by age—Children, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Tenure based on householder. Years are financial
years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/18). In each cell, the colour represents the proportion of people of that age in that year in a
given tenure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g003
Fig 2. Tenure by age—Adults, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Tenure based on individual adults. Years are financial
years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/18). In each cell, the colour represents the proportion of people of that age in that year in a
given tenure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g002
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The first panel in Fig 2 shows the proportion of adults who are owner occupiers (for any
given age/year). It shows how people tend to attain the status of home owners through their
working age years, but it also shows the ageing profile of home owners over the period covered
here. Around 2000 when home ownership rates were highest, the peak age for ownership was
in the 50s. At that time, home ownership rates for people of retirement age were lower as fewer
had made it to home ownership during their working lives in earlier periods. As barriers to
entry to home ownership rose after 2007/8, people are taking longer to achieve ownership and
fewer are doing so. Ownership rates are dropping for all working age groups so the peak own-
ership group is getting older. This upward shift does appear to have halted in the last few years,
however.
Social renting (second panel) has the most neutral age distribution now. In the 1990s, it
housed disproportionate numbers of pensioners but that is no longer the case. We can also see
some signs of the slowing of entry to this tenure for young adults in their 20s, reflecting the
declining availability of social housing. By contrast, the third panel shows very clearly how the
expansion of private renting is strongly concentrated among young adults. The green triangle
bottom-right in that panel represents ‘Generation Rent’ in a simple visual form. This appears
to be a classic ‘cohort effect’–a change that affects those who were 20 or younger around 2000
and which has remained a feature for this group as they have aged. Before 2000, the sector was
focussed largely on those in their early 20s but they would typically spend only a few years in it
before moving on to one of the two dominant tenures. By 2015, the PRS was home to a signifi-
cant proportion of those in their 20s and mid-30s, and they can expect to spend more years in
the sector on average.
The last panel shows the proportion of people living ‘care of’ (or in a small minority of
cases, ‘rent free’). Almost all 16–19 year olds live ‘care of’ their parents, moving out during
their twenties. There are some signs on an increase in the age of leaving home for this group
over the period but it appears very modest when compared with the rise of the PRS for youn-
ger adults.
With transitions to owner occupation and social renting delayed, more young adults are
starting families while renting privately, and this shows up in a rise in the proportion of chil-
dren in the PRS, particularly young children (Fig 3, third panel). In 1994/5, just 8 per cent of
children five or under were found in this sector. By 2017/18, it was 28 per cent. The proportion
falls as children age, suggesting that most have left the PRS before they have been at school for
more than a year or two.
One other prominent feature of Fig 3 is the tenure for children 17 and over, where owner
occupation plays a disproportionate role in the years up to about 2008. This does not reflect
the movement of households with older children into home ownership at this time. Rather, it
reflects the much greater propensity for young people in these households to stay on at school
after 16 at that time. In the late 1990s/early 2000s, those in social renting were much more
likely to leave school so they were then counted as adults, effectively disappearing from the
picture provided by this Figure. In the late 1990s, two-thirds of 17/18 years olds in owner-
occupier households remained in school compared with just one third of those in social rent-
ing. The gap narrowed steadily until, from 2012, there was no difference and this feature there-
fore disappears.
Adult poverty by tenure
Fig 4 shows tenure changes for adults, now split between poor and non-poor groups using the
relative low-income poverty measure (after housing costs). Colours now show, for a each age/
year, the proportion in a given tenure within each poverty category. The Figure shows clearly
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the effective targeting of social housing on those in social needs. It houses relatively few non-
poor households but a large share of the poor. In recent years, it has played less of a role in
housing poor pensioners, more of whom are now found in home ownership. Owner occupa-
tion is clearly the dominant tenure for non-poor adults although the figure also shows how it
house a substantial proportion of the (older) poor as well. The reductions in home ownership
rates for working age groups since 2007 is apparent for both poor and non-poor but the drop
is particularly marked for poor adults in their 30s/early 40s.
Fig 4 also shows the clear divisions within ‘Generation Rent’. For poor adults, the growth in
private renting is far greater and reaches well into their 30s and 40s for a substantial propor-
tion. Indeed, the share of young adults in private renting is now greater than the share in social
renting: the PRS has replaced social renting as the home for those who are young and poor.
For non-poor adults, private renting is more largely confined to those in their 20s/early 30s.
Their exit to owner occupation is later than it was twenty years ago but few remain renting pri-
vately after about 30.
Fig 4. Tenure by age and poverty status—Adults, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Poverty defined as households
below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are financial years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/
18). In each cell, the colour represents the proportion of people of that age in that year in a given tenure, separately for
poor and non-poor groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g004
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The Figure also shows how housing pathways for the youngest adults depend on poverty
status as discussed above. Those in non-poor households tend to remain longer in the family
home as they continue for longer in education. Those from poorer households tend to follow
the ‘fast track’ route to independent living. For the former, there appears to be little change in
the age at which they exit the family home although their destination now is much more likely
to be private renting. For those in poor households, there is more evidence of a delayed depar-
ture and more now go to private renting rather than social.
Using the insights from the Lexis surfaces, Fig 5 summarises the trends for adults under 40,
showing the share of poverty in each tenure. It shows very clearly the meteoric rise in the pro-
portion of these people living in private renting between 2000 and 2010 as well as the more
modest increase in the proportion living ‘care of’ another household. These two tenures now
account for two thirds of all under 40s in poverty, up from just over one third 20 years ago. Pri-
vate renting on its own is now home to 42 per cent of poor young adults, more than owner
occupation and social renting combined.
One other important feature of Fig 5 is the marked slowing in the growth of private renting
since about 20120, coinciding the changes in LHA eligibility. Indeed, there has been no
increase over the last four years. We noted above the evidence that landlords were becoming
more reluctant to let to those on LHA, and this Figure appears to support that. There was ini-
tially some rise in the proportion ‘care of’ in this period but that has fallen back. There has also
been a halt to the decline of owner occupation and a modest rise in social renting.
Fig 5. Share of poor adults under 40 by tenure—1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Poverty defined as households
below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are financial years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/
18).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g005
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The rise in private renting has not been even across the country but has been particularly
strong in the regions where high prices make buying less affordable, notably London and
the South. In those cases, the proportion of poor adults in private renting is correspondingly
higher (Fig 6). In London, the majority of poor adults in their late 20s/early 30s now live in
the PRS and a large minority will rent privately through their 30s/early 40s. The proportions
are slightly lower in the South and lower again in the rest of the country. In the Midlands
and Scotland, the proportion has been falling in the last few years, largely because the pro-
portion in social renting has been rising. The rises have halted or slowed in every other
region as well.
Fig 1 showed that the proportion of adults living ‘care of’ another household had not risen
overall. In Fig 6, we see that this masks rather different trends for poor and non-poor adults.
For the non-poor, the share living ‘care of’ is fairly static or declining in every region whereas,
for the poor, it is rising in every case except Northern Ireland. That region has a relatively high
proportion to start with–only London is higher.
Fig 6 also shows that the slowing in the growth of private renting in the last five years
applies to poor adults, not those who are not poor. In all the regions, the growth in private
renting for non-poor has continued unabated, albeit at a lower absolute level, whereas the rise
of poor private renters has either halted or reversed (with the possible exception of North/
Wales). Again, this strongly suggests that the cuts in LHA have had a significant impact on
landlords’ willingness to rent to low-income households although the improving access to
social renting may also be a factor.
Child poverty by tenure
Fig 7 shows the equivalent picture of tenure change for children by poverty status as for adults.
The rise in private renting for those in poverty is far greater than for the rest, again revealing the
divisions within Generation Rent. For non-poor children, the experience of private renting is
limited to a small minority and confined very largely to the pre-school years. For poor children,
Fig 6. Regional variations in tenure by poverty status—Adults, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Poverty defined as
households below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are financial years (i.e. ‘2017’
is 2017/18). Data for Northern Ireland not available before 2002/3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g006
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the experience is both more common and likely to be longer lasting. Significant proportions of
poor children are found in the PRS through primary and into secondary school years.
For the years since 2004/5, the FRS provides two further measures of child poverty; see
methods section above for details. These capture poverty at more extreme levels than the low-
income measure used in the rest of this paper. All three show a consistent picture of rising lev-
els of poverty in private renting and at similar rates but, with the more ‘extreme’ measures, the
shares are slightly lower (Fig 8). The proportion of materially deprived children in the PRS has
risen from 17 to 32 per cent in 12 years (central panel) while the proportion in severe child
poverty has risen from 11 to 26 per cent (right panel). In all three cases, the PRS has overtaken
owner occupation in the share of poor children it accommodates. Social renting plays a more
important role for groups facing higher levels of disadvantage, and still houses half of those
materially deprived or in severe poverty. Whichever measure we use, however, the growth of
poverty in private renting has halted since 2013 while the shares in social renting have stopped
falling and even begun to rise again.
Fig 7. Tenure by age and poverty status—Children, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Poverty defined as households
below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are financial years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/
18).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g007
Fig 8. Tenure shares for children in low income poverty, material deprivation and severe poverty by tenure—
2004/5-2017/8. (A) Children in low income poverty. (B) Children in material deprivation. (C) Children in severe child
poverty. FRS/HBAI data. For definitions of material deprivation and severe child poverty see text and [11]. Years are
financial years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/18). Modest smoothing applied to data to limit noise.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g008
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As with adults, there are substantial variations for children across the regions (Fig 9), with
London having particularly high proportions of poor children in private renting: around 40
per cent in recent years which was as many as social renting. For the youngest children, a
majority of those in poverty in the capital are in the PRS. Scotland has the lowest proportions
of poor children in private renting due in large part to the greater role played by social rented
housing there. The slowing in the growth of poor children in private renting in recent years is
apparent in every region but there is also some slowing in the rise for non-poor children. In
London, the latter group even declines slightly.
Instability, private renting and poverty
The last part of the analysis turns to the issue of security and stability of tenancies. The rise in
poor households in the PRS would be less of an issue for policy if they were able to achieve
security of tenure there. The question is therefore whether poor private renters face the same
kinds of instability and short-term letting as others in the PRS or whether, on the contrary, a
separate sub-sector of the PRS has emerged offering this group more stable, long-term rentals.
As noted above, we do not have a measure of the legal security of tenure of PRS households
but we can examine rates of mobility as some guide. Specifically, the FRS lets us examine the
proportion of households who have been resident for less than one year in their current
accommodation. This is an imperfect measure of insecurity since we cannot distinguish where
recent moves reflect a positive choice or were a response to problems including forced reloca-
tion. Nevertheless, variations by age and poverty status, and over time give some insights into
the nature of insecurity in different tenures (Fig 10).
For owner occupation and social renting, high levels of short residency only occur for
people in their 20s/early 30s. At these ages, most people will have just entered these sectors.
At later ages, mobility rates for these tenures are much lower as most people remain for
many years in the same place. With the PRS, there are also high mobility rates for people in
their early 20s associated with first entry to the sector but rates continue to be high for
Fig 9. Regional variations in tenure by poverty status—Children, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI data. Poverty defined
as households below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are financial years (i.e.
‘2017’ is 2017/18).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g009
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people in their 30s and 40s. There do not appear to be substantial differences between poor
and non-poor adults for these two tenures. In both cases, mobility rates have fallen slightly,
even allowing for the slight discontinuity in the data between 2011 and 2012 discussed
above.
By contrast, high mobility in the PRS affects people well into their 30s and 40s, especially in
the earlier years. The situation up to 2012 appears very similar for poor and non-poor adults.
In the more recent years, mobility rates appear significantly lower in both cases, reflecting in
part the discontinuity due to changes in question wording. In this period, mobility rates for
poorer households do appear to be somewhat lower than for non-poor This may some indica-
tion that the sector is beginning to function a slightly different way for this group. For poor
adults in their 30s, turnover may be higher than in social renting but it is lower than for non-
poor adults of the same age. It is of course difficult to determine the extent to which this repre-
sents choice and satisfaction with current accommodation rather than constraint despite
dissatisfaction.
Fig 10. Proportions resident less than one year by tenure and poverty status—Adults, 1994/5-2017/8. FRS/HBAI
data. Poverty defined as households below 60 per cent of contemporary median income, after housing costs. Years are
financial years (i.e. ‘2017’ is 2017/18). In each cell, the colour represents the proportion of people for that age/year and
poverty status who had been resident for less than one year in the property.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0228273.g010
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Conclusions and discussion
This paper shows that the ‘Generation Rent’ experience is not one shared equally by young
people. While a number of existing studies have charted the uneven experience socially and
spatially through qualitative work [44] [45], this paper contributes a much more detailed quan-
titative analysis which shows the scale and pace of the changes, and how the incidence varies
with poverty status in particular. It makes clear therefore how the rise of private renting has
been particularly marked for poorer young adults and their children. Private renting is now
the dominant housing experience for this group. In 2017/18, 42 per cent of adults under 40 in
poverty lived in private renting, almost double the proportion of 20 years ago, and more than
owner occupation and social renting combined. For children in poverty, 33 per cent now live
in private renting, three times the level of 20 years ago, and nearly as many as in social renting
(42 per cent). For a substantial proportion of these children, this is likely to continue through
primary and even secondary school years. Poor children are twice as likely to live in private
renting as non-poor while poor adults are more than one and a half times as likely to do so.
There are important regional variations, with the rises particularly large in the more pressured
housing markets of London and the South of England, but they are found across the UK. The
term ‘Generation Rent’ is thus a misnomer. As Coulter (2017) argued, there is a class divide
here as much as a generational one.
The situation in the UK remains quite different to that in other liberal welfare regimes such
as Australia or the US. Here, we still have a substantial social rented sector which continues to
be an important destination tenure for working age adults. However it is also clear that a sub-
stantial, unplanned and largely unrecognised shift in the housing circumstances of poorer
households has occurred over the last two decades towards a highly deregulated form of rent-
ing marked by problems of insecurity. Low-income groups face the same levels of insecurity in
private renting as others but the impact of this is likely to be greater, both because it is likely to
affect them for longer but also because it is likely to be a source of greater stress given their
weak position in the housing market.
This shift in the housing circumstance of poor households can be seen as one manifest-
ation of the broad retrenchment of welfare provision which has been underway in the UK as
in many other countries in recent decades and which has coincided with rising insecurity in
employment and earnings stagnation. In this particular case, it arises from the long-term
reduction in provision of housing subsidies through social renting over the last four decades
combined with the more recent reductions in personal housing subsidies (LHA) as well as
reductions in wider welfare entitlement for the working age population, and young adults in
particular. This makes young people increasingly dependent on family for their welfare [37],
resulting in the rising inequality in housing experiences and outcomes we see here.
There is an urgent need to understand more about the welfare impacts of these changes,
updating and extending Kemp’s [7] analysis. Building on studies which have begun to chart
the social and spatial differences in the experience of contemporary private renting, includ-
ing many cited in this paper, we need to understand the quality of housing provided to low-
income private renters, both physical conditions and management, and the affordability of this
tenure and its impacts on overall financial stress. We need to examine wider impacts, notably
on employment incentives and outcomes, as well as access to social networks or support and
the wider psycho-social impacts of insecurity. And we need to improve understanding of pri-
vate renting careers, not just the length of individual tenancies.
The re-growth of private renting has been in line with the objectives of successive govern-
ments since the 1980s. However, the pace of change after 2000 clearly took government by sur-
prise, leading to efforts to dampen down supply by increasing taxation on landlords, and
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reduce demand by introducing subsidies for first time buyers [28] [46]. There has been little
recognition of how these changes impact on low-income households, let alone a proper debate
about the reforms needed to ensure that group can access decent accommodation within this
tenure. When combined with the restrictions on LHA entitlements, the recent changes appear
to worsen the situation for these groups by making landlords less willing to house them.
The main policy change for private renting currently under discussion is a move to reintro-
duce security of tenure, in combination with limits on the ability of landlords to increase rents
for sitting tenants. In theory at least, security of tenure has been reintroduced in Scotland for
new tenancies from December 2017 and the UK Government has signalled an interest in a
similar move for England and Wales. The consequences of such moves depend, on the one
hand, on the effectiveness of the regulations and their enforcement and, on the other hand,
on the responses of landlords in terms of investment decisions and their willingness to rent to
low-income households. What is clear is that, on their own, these changes do not provide low-
income households with any more resources for housing so they are likely to continue to strug-
gle to find adequate accommodation in the market-driven PRS.
Finally, moving beyond the substantive discussion, the paper seeks to make an important
methodological contribution by demonstrating the analytical value of Lexis surfaces. These are
a powerful tool for rendering the growing quantities of social survey data accessible, particu-
larly to non-technical audiences. In this case, they reveal how changes over time in one charac-
teristic, housing tenure, have affected specific age groups at specific times without the need for
modelling or other complex techniques. They enable these changes to be further disaggregated
by a wide variety of categories, such as poverty status and region, or to be overlaid with other
outcomes such as length of residence. In this case, these rich analytical descriptions reveal an
example of a cohort change, captured by the term ‘Generation Rent’, but they are equally
suited to revealing effects limited to particular age groups or occurring at particular points in
time. As Minton [12] argues, they deserve to be used much more widely as part of the process
of data visualisation and exploration ahead of and alongside theoretically-driven analyses.
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